Between BIC and Philosophy, I've written a substantial number of papers in my undergraduate career here at Baylor, and I can say quite confidently that the process we've used in this class has been by far the most beneficial.
In most classes, when you write a paper, you are given a prompt,you produce a paper, you turn it in, and then you recieve your grade and some feedback. In some cases, an outline or a draft is due prior to the paper's due date, but this is usually only in lower level classes. In these cases, a student is provided with some level of feedback to incorporate into their final draft, but usually this is done only to improve the quality of the grade that the student hopes to recieve on his final draft.
However, in this mode of doing the paper, the entire process was different. We were not given a prompt, but rather were able to research a topic that heavily interested us, with the minor stipulation that it relate to a Classical Philosopher in some manner or another. Before we produced a paper, we produced an abstract and got peer feedback on it. This enabled us to alter our trajectory for the paper before committing to one that didn't say what we were getting at fully enough. After the abstract, a rough draft was due. It didn't have to be as long as the final draft, which enabled us to actually use it as a rough draft (in contrast to those classes who say "turn in a rough draft, but it should closely resemble your final copy"). This allowed us to more fully develop our ideas and commit to them but still be open to critique and improvement which we got from 3 different sources: our peer editors, Dr. Schultz's edits, and our presentation. The presentation enabled us to explain our argument in different media. Through preparing for my presentation, I actually gained a better grasp on my argument myself, which enabled me to be more clear as I tweaked my paper for the final copy. Finally, the review that we wrote compelled us to look back at the process, and reinforce in our minds that it was more about the process thant the grade.
Overall, the seminar style of writing the paper was a definite success, and I can tell this by the fact that I've been thinking, not about tallyng up the scores on all my rubrics to see if I'm going to actually make an A on it, but about what I've gleaned fromt he process as a whole.
Wednesday, April 23, 2014
Monday, April 14, 2014
Knowing the Good = Doing the Good?
No matter how many times I read and reread this article by Robert Coles, it never ceases to strike me in an odd way each time. I can't help but think that these are some of the most true words in existence. Despite Socrates' claim that "to know the good is to do the good," it seems that many times in 'real' life we are left with people who seem to know the good and yet refrain from doing it. There are only two logical causes for this effect: either they do not really know the good (that is, that knowing the good is something other than intellectual knowledge of the good), or that knowing the good isn't sufficient for doing the good. I am more inclined to pick the first of the two.
I was actually having a conversation with my friend earlier today; we were discussing bad eating/exercise habits. He said "I know eating this way is really bad for me, and I am fully aware of the consequences, but I just don't really care that much." I mean, the kid practically lives on a diet of pasta, butter, cheese, and all things deep-fried. His first statement is true. Eating that way is bad for him. His last statement is probably true as well. It's the middle statement that is questionable: "I am fully aware of the consequences..." I argued against him, saying that if he was really truly aware of the consequences, he would care more. I mean, we all wonder at the logical sanity of the person who carries around an oxygen tank yet still smokes a pack a day, but how is that different from our daily claims that we should eat less and exercise more? In each case, we claim we know what we are doing is bad, but we don't care enough to change it. I think we don't honestly believe in the bad-ness of what we are doing. If we did, we would change. Hindsight is 20/20 - and that's because once we are suffering the consequences of our actions, we truly KNOW that the action was actually bad for us. Prior to that, we didn't believe it enough to change it.
I think Christianity speaks prominently on this issue. For years, until I made a decisively immoral decision, I struggled with feeling like I needed God. I mean, those promiscuous drug-addicts and alcoholics, they needed God; but me? I was 14 and couldn't even squish a bug without feeling horrendous guilt. For all intents and purposes, I was a pretty morally-upright kid. I struggled with feeling like I needed God, because I didn't KNOW I needed him. I didn't KNOW that I was sinful. I didn't KNOW that I couldn't be good enough to please Him on my own. Once I made that decisively immoral decision, I KNEW that I was deeply, inherently sinful, and that I needed God - and I mean, I knew it in the deepest fibers of my being. And once I KNEW that I needed God, repentance was almost immediate. I finally knew the good, and so I acted upon it.
The Coles article resonates deeply within me, because I've also had that same struggle that the girl Coles talks about had. When I was in the 10th grade, living overseas, I went to a missionary boarding school. Instead of dorms, we lived in group-home style houses called 'hostels.' Every hostel had a girls' hall and a boys' hall, and a living area in the middle. We lived together like a big family, and even affectionately termed each other "hostel siblings". One of my best friends lived in my hostel with me, and he was the most obviously Christian guy I knew. All of the adults in the community respected him, he led worship, and went to Bible Study every day. One night, he tried to rape me. It took me years to get over that, and now I can talk about it, but it's made this topic of prime interest to me. How could this "upstanding, Christian" guy do something so HORRIBLE? The only logical answer is that he didn't actually KNOW the good. He had all the outward appearances of knowing the good, but inside of his soul, if he had known the deep badness of the action he attempted, he could not possibly have done it. He could only know the deep badness of the action he attempted if he knew the good; otherwise, there's nothing to contrast it with. He didn't know the good and so he didn't know the bad. So, it makes doing the bad a whole lot easier. If he had known the good, he would have known the badness of his behavior.
Likewise, the boy in question in Coles article didn't know the good. He had outward behaviors of knowing the good (good test scores, good grades, etc.) but he didn't know it in his soul. He didn't KNOW it in the deepest part of him. It didn't resonate with him. So, he knew it in his head, but he didn't know it in his soul. I think those two things are profoundly different. I can learn about what it's like to be homeless, but until I've been homeless I can't know it in my soul. By learning intellectually about homelessness, sympathy can be sparked within me, and I think that's like a shadow of actually knowing what homelessness is like, but it isn't the real thing. When we learn intellectually about the good, that knowledge can yield a sort of 'sympathy', if you will, and can give us a shadow of the good, but we can't truly KNOW the good through intellectual knowledge alone. It has to be something more?
So, how do we know the good? As a Christian, I believe that God reveals the good to me. If God is the good for which I am striving, then my relationship with Him is all about knowing Him, and consequently is about knowing the good. The more I know God, the more I will act according to His will, and the more I will act in a way that is pleasing to Him.
How do we know the good apart from God? I would answer that apart from God, there is no such thing.
I was actually having a conversation with my friend earlier today; we were discussing bad eating/exercise habits. He said "I know eating this way is really bad for me, and I am fully aware of the consequences, but I just don't really care that much." I mean, the kid practically lives on a diet of pasta, butter, cheese, and all things deep-fried. His first statement is true. Eating that way is bad for him. His last statement is probably true as well. It's the middle statement that is questionable: "I am fully aware of the consequences..." I argued against him, saying that if he was really truly aware of the consequences, he would care more. I mean, we all wonder at the logical sanity of the person who carries around an oxygen tank yet still smokes a pack a day, but how is that different from our daily claims that we should eat less and exercise more? In each case, we claim we know what we are doing is bad, but we don't care enough to change it. I think we don't honestly believe in the bad-ness of what we are doing. If we did, we would change. Hindsight is 20/20 - and that's because once we are suffering the consequences of our actions, we truly KNOW that the action was actually bad for us. Prior to that, we didn't believe it enough to change it.
I think Christianity speaks prominently on this issue. For years, until I made a decisively immoral decision, I struggled with feeling like I needed God. I mean, those promiscuous drug-addicts and alcoholics, they needed God; but me? I was 14 and couldn't even squish a bug without feeling horrendous guilt. For all intents and purposes, I was a pretty morally-upright kid. I struggled with feeling like I needed God, because I didn't KNOW I needed him. I didn't KNOW that I was sinful. I didn't KNOW that I couldn't be good enough to please Him on my own. Once I made that decisively immoral decision, I KNEW that I was deeply, inherently sinful, and that I needed God - and I mean, I knew it in the deepest fibers of my being. And once I KNEW that I needed God, repentance was almost immediate. I finally knew the good, and so I acted upon it.
The Coles article resonates deeply within me, because I've also had that same struggle that the girl Coles talks about had. When I was in the 10th grade, living overseas, I went to a missionary boarding school. Instead of dorms, we lived in group-home style houses called 'hostels.' Every hostel had a girls' hall and a boys' hall, and a living area in the middle. We lived together like a big family, and even affectionately termed each other "hostel siblings". One of my best friends lived in my hostel with me, and he was the most obviously Christian guy I knew. All of the adults in the community respected him, he led worship, and went to Bible Study every day. One night, he tried to rape me. It took me years to get over that, and now I can talk about it, but it's made this topic of prime interest to me. How could this "upstanding, Christian" guy do something so HORRIBLE? The only logical answer is that he didn't actually KNOW the good. He had all the outward appearances of knowing the good, but inside of his soul, if he had known the deep badness of the action he attempted, he could not possibly have done it. He could only know the deep badness of the action he attempted if he knew the good; otherwise, there's nothing to contrast it with. He didn't know the good and so he didn't know the bad. So, it makes doing the bad a whole lot easier. If he had known the good, he would have known the badness of his behavior.
Likewise, the boy in question in Coles article didn't know the good. He had outward behaviors of knowing the good (good test scores, good grades, etc.) but he didn't know it in his soul. He didn't KNOW it in the deepest part of him. It didn't resonate with him. So, he knew it in his head, but he didn't know it in his soul. I think those two things are profoundly different. I can learn about what it's like to be homeless, but until I've been homeless I can't know it in my soul. By learning intellectually about homelessness, sympathy can be sparked within me, and I think that's like a shadow of actually knowing what homelessness is like, but it isn't the real thing. When we learn intellectually about the good, that knowledge can yield a sort of 'sympathy', if you will, and can give us a shadow of the good, but we can't truly KNOW the good through intellectual knowledge alone. It has to be something more?
So, how do we know the good? As a Christian, I believe that God reveals the good to me. If God is the good for which I am striving, then my relationship with Him is all about knowing Him, and consequently is about knowing the good. The more I know God, the more I will act according to His will, and the more I will act in a way that is pleasing to Him.
How do we know the good apart from God? I would answer that apart from God, there is no such thing.
Friday, April 4, 2014
Pleasure vs. Happiness
In Book 10 of Nichomachean Ethics, Eudoxus posits that pleasure could potentially be the supreme good because we often pursue things for pleasure's sake, and it also makes other things more desirable.
Aristotle makes the case that there are many things we value that are not necessarily pleasant. For example, exercising may be good for me, but running definitely does not bring me pleasure.
He also says that pleasure cannot be a process because it does not start out incomplete and then become complete, and it does not take place over time. Thus, it can never fit in with virtue, because he has already established that virtue is a consistent habit.
Because pleasure cannot be the chief end, Aristotle says that happiness is the chief end with contemplation being its highest and most complete form. Today, most people associate pleasure with happiness, and think that they always come as a package deal. However, Aristotle would say that there is a measure of habituation that comes with happiness. Furthermore, most do not see contemplation as a thing that brings pleasure, but Aristotle says that to contemplate like the gods do is to be happy.
Happiness, then, is a step above moral virtue, which Aristotle has spent the previous parts of the book explicating. The key difference between happiness and virtue is that happiness entails the intellect, or rational contemplation. Additionally, the moral virtues are all done for the sake of happiness. Aristotle's definition of happiness is most like philosophical contemplation.
So here I am in the library on a Friday night, working on my research paper, doing a lot of philosophical contemplation, and being "happy," per Aristotle, though not necessarily filled with pleasure :P
Aristotle makes the case that there are many things we value that are not necessarily pleasant. For example, exercising may be good for me, but running definitely does not bring me pleasure.
He also says that pleasure cannot be a process because it does not start out incomplete and then become complete, and it does not take place over time. Thus, it can never fit in with virtue, because he has already established that virtue is a consistent habit.
Because pleasure cannot be the chief end, Aristotle says that happiness is the chief end with contemplation being its highest and most complete form. Today, most people associate pleasure with happiness, and think that they always come as a package deal. However, Aristotle would say that there is a measure of habituation that comes with happiness. Furthermore, most do not see contemplation as a thing that brings pleasure, but Aristotle says that to contemplate like the gods do is to be happy.
Happiness, then, is a step above moral virtue, which Aristotle has spent the previous parts of the book explicating. The key difference between happiness and virtue is that happiness entails the intellect, or rational contemplation. Additionally, the moral virtues are all done for the sake of happiness. Aristotle's definition of happiness is most like philosophical contemplation.
So here I am in the library on a Friday night, working on my research paper, doing a lot of philosophical contemplation, and being "happy," per Aristotle, though not necessarily filled with pleasure :P
Wednesday, April 2, 2014
Aristotle, Friendship, and the Lover-Beloved Relationship
Aristotle describes three different types of friendship: friendships of utility, friendships of pleasure, and friendships of virtue, with the latter being the most Good. Aristotle argues that friendship is complete virtue, and so it should be placed above all other virtues, including honor and justice.
First, Aristotle describes friendships of utility. He says that elderly people, because they are more experienced and efficient in life, are prone to these sorts of friendships because they are looking to find what is advantageous for them. This comes from a self-love of utility, which is ultimately selfish.
Second, Aristotle describes friendships of pleasure, saying that the young are more likely to make these sorts of friendships because they are passion-filled and seeking pleasure. They flit around from one friendship to another, because they are filled with self-love of pleasure. This also is ultimately selfish.
Third, Aristotle describes friendships of virtue which are the most esteemed. In this friendship between two people of equally virtuous status, each person wills only the good for his friend, disregarding self-love of pleasure and of utility. Only good people - or people pursuing the Good - can handle these sorts of friendships, because there is nothing to gain since both friends are equal to each other, and united in their pursuance of virtue.
Aristotle believes that true love is the product of a virtuous friendship.
In Book 8, Chapter 7, Line 11, Aristotle starts talking about friendships that are based on superiority, such as that which would arise between a younger man and an older man. He argues that "in all friendships based on a superiority, the feelings of friendly affection too ought to be proportional" according to the ranks of superiority. For example, if a person that is more esteemed or older becomes friends with one who is less esteemed or younger, it is proper that the lesser individual should love the greater more than the greater loves the lesser. In doing this, the hierarchy sort of levels out, and they can have that virtuous sort of friendship that is the best kind. This appears to me to be analogous to the lover-beloved relationship discussed in the Symposium. In Chapter 8, Aristotle goes on to say "But the many seem, on account of their love of honor, to wish to be loved more than to love." This also seems to be the problem in the Symposium with all the tension and drama that occurs, especially with Alcibaides (however you spell his name). He is jealous for the honor one gets from being the beloved of Socrates, and thus wants to be loved more than he wants to truly love Socrates. This is why their relationship seems strained, and perhaps if Alcibaides was more focused on loving than on being loved, then their relationship would be Good and they could pursue virtue together. This holds true for many relationships today as well. (Yay Aristotle with that good ol' marriage advice!)
First, Aristotle describes friendships of utility. He says that elderly people, because they are more experienced and efficient in life, are prone to these sorts of friendships because they are looking to find what is advantageous for them. This comes from a self-love of utility, which is ultimately selfish.
Second, Aristotle describes friendships of pleasure, saying that the young are more likely to make these sorts of friendships because they are passion-filled and seeking pleasure. They flit around from one friendship to another, because they are filled with self-love of pleasure. This also is ultimately selfish.
Third, Aristotle describes friendships of virtue which are the most esteemed. In this friendship between two people of equally virtuous status, each person wills only the good for his friend, disregarding self-love of pleasure and of utility. Only good people - or people pursuing the Good - can handle these sorts of friendships, because there is nothing to gain since both friends are equal to each other, and united in their pursuance of virtue.
Aristotle believes that true love is the product of a virtuous friendship.
In Book 8, Chapter 7, Line 11, Aristotle starts talking about friendships that are based on superiority, such as that which would arise between a younger man and an older man. He argues that "in all friendships based on a superiority, the feelings of friendly affection too ought to be proportional" according to the ranks of superiority. For example, if a person that is more esteemed or older becomes friends with one who is less esteemed or younger, it is proper that the lesser individual should love the greater more than the greater loves the lesser. In doing this, the hierarchy sort of levels out, and they can have that virtuous sort of friendship that is the best kind. This appears to me to be analogous to the lover-beloved relationship discussed in the Symposium. In Chapter 8, Aristotle goes on to say "But the many seem, on account of their love of honor, to wish to be loved more than to love." This also seems to be the problem in the Symposium with all the tension and drama that occurs, especially with Alcibaides (however you spell his name). He is jealous for the honor one gets from being the beloved of Socrates, and thus wants to be loved more than he wants to truly love Socrates. This is why their relationship seems strained, and perhaps if Alcibaides was more focused on loving than on being loved, then their relationship would be Good and they could pursue virtue together. This holds true for many relationships today as well. (Yay Aristotle with that good ol' marriage advice!)
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